Jennifer Erickson

Dangerous Trade: Arms Exports, Human Rights, and International Reputation Jennifer Erickson

Marc Notes: Includes bibliographical references and index. Biographical Note: Jennifer L. Erickson is the White Family Sesquicentennial Assistant Professor in Political Science and International Studies at Boston College. She is also a faculty affiliate at the Institute for Quantitative Social Science at Harvard University and previously held research affiliations with Dartmouth College, the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, and the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin. She received her Ph. D. in government from Cornell University. Review Quotes: In novel and creative ways, this books integrates a variety of theoretical approaches to security studies, arms, and global governance; international and domestic affairs; and qualitative and quantitative data. Fresh thinking and certainly original, it is the opposite of re-chewing what others have already said, or going down paths already trodden. Indeed, this book shows an innovative mind at work.--Ulrich Krotz, European University InstituteTable of Contents: AcknowledgmentsList of Abbreviations1. Introduction and Overview2. "Responsible" Arms Transfer Policy and the Politics of Social Reputation3. History and Contemporary Trends in Conventional Arms Export Controls4. Explaining Commitment: International Reputation and "Responsible" Arms Transfer Policy5. Explaining Compliance: Domestic Reputation and Arms Trade Scandal6. Conclusions and ImplicationsAppendix A. Multilateral Conventional Arms Control in the Twentieth CenturyAppendix B. Data Sources and CodingAppendix C. Full Statistical ResultsNotesReferencesIndexPublisher Marketing: In 2013, the United Nations approved the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), which sets legally binding standards to regulate global arms exports. This groundbreaking treaty reflects a growing concern that small and major conventional arms play a significant role in perpetuating human rights violations, conflict, and societal instability worldwide. While many countries once staunchly opposed shared export controls and their perceived threat to political and economic autonomy, they are now beginning to embrace numerous agreements, such as the ATT and the EU Code of Conduct. Jennifer L. Erickson explores the reasons top arms-exporting democracies have put aside past sovereignty, security, and economic worries in favor of humanitarian arms transfer controls, and she follows the early effects of this about-face on export practice. She begins with a brief history of failed modern arms-export control initiatives and then tracks arms transfer trends over time. Pinpointing the normative shifts in the 1990s that put humanitarian arms control on the table, she reveals that these states committed to these policies out of concern for their international reputations. She also highlights how arms-trade scandals threaten domestic reputations and thus help improve compliance. Using statistical data and interviews conducted in France, Germany, Belgium, the United Kingdom, and the United States, Erickson challenges existing IR theories of state behavior, while providing insight into the role of reputation as a social mechanism and the importance of government transparency and accountability in generating compliance with new norms and rules.