Michael B Weimer

Preparing to Be Deceived: Counterdeception at the Operational Level of War Michael B Weimer

Publisher Marketing: This study examines counterdeception capabilities in U. S. Army operational forces. The research question asks, "what should be the U. S. Army's capability to counter Soviet deception at the operationa1 level of war?" The study first examines counterdeception theory from the writings of Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, Liddell Hart, Barton Whaley and others to determine what theory suggests our counterdeception capabilities should be. Next, it traces the historical development and use of counterdeception at the operational level of war by analyzing five World War II European theater operations: the 1940 German invasion of France, the German invasion of Russia (BARBAROSSA), the Kharkov operation, the Allied landings at Normandy (FORTITUDE), and the German Ardennes counteroffensive (Bulge). Theoretically- and historically-derived capabilities are contrasted with current U. S. and Soviet doctrine, followed by a contemporary analysis of Soviet/Warsaw Pact deception against NATO. The final section draws conclusions and implications concerning operational counterdeception in the U. S. Army, focusing upon the areas of doctrine, training, resources and command and staff processes. This study concludes there is a significant gap between what should be and what actually is a U. S. operational force's capability to counter enemy deception. Doctrinally, the Army doesn't recognize the concept of counterdeception, nor is it a subset of counterintelligence. DOD definitions of the term exclude identifying foreign deception operations. Proponency for counterdeception is unclear. All U. S. Army doctrinal manuals on deception exclude the concept of countering enemy deception operations. Moreover, Corps and echelons above corps deception elements currently omit counterdeception training in their mission statements and operations. The study concludes that counterdeception operations require talented analysts skilled in thinking like the enemy and capable of using alternative hypothesis, competitive anal